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Abstract: The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is widely used in different kinds of security
applications. The substitution box (S-box) is the main component of many modern symmetric
encryption ciphers that provides confusion between the secret key and ciphertext. The S-box
component that is used in AES is fixed. If we construct this component dynamically, the encryption
strength of AES would be greater than before. In this manuscript, we used chaotic logistic
map, Mobius transformation and symmetric group S256 to construct S-box for AES. The idea
behind the proposed work is to make supplementary safe S-box. The presented S-box is analyzed
for the following analyses: linear approximation probability (LP), nonlinearity (NL), differential
approximation probability (DP), strict avalanche criterion (SAC), and bit independence criterion
(BIC). The analyses show that the proposed technique is useful in generating high resistance S-box to
known attacks.
Keywords: substitution box; chaos; general linear group; security analysis; nonlinearity
1. Introduction
The concept of substitution box (S-box) was first given by Claude Shannon in 1949 [1] after
that this component got the attention of many researchers. The S-box has wide usage in secure
communication, and it is the core component in popular block ciphers such as data encryption
standard (DES), international data encryption algorithm (IDEA) and advanced encryption standard
(AES) [2] etc. Most of the time, the strength of any cryptosystem [3–8] depends on the resistance of
S-boxes against known attacks, which is why, to design a robust cipher, the synthesis of strong S-boxes
is required. The strength of S-box [9–14] usually depends on some algebraic and statistical criteria,
such as linear and differential analyses, strict avalanche criterion (SAC) to measure maximal confusion
ability between key and cipher text, bit independence criteria to know the dependency of plaintext,
and ciphertext bits. Linear and differential cryptanalysis shows that it is essential to propose dominant
ciphers that can resist renown attacks. The AES is largely acknowledged as a valid cryptosystem. One
of the vital components of AES is its S-box, which is constructed based on the inversion of GF(28)
elements and an affine transformation. Due to AES popularity in the communication systems, S-box
got more attention.
In the past 10 to 15 years, some cryptosystems have been constructed by chaotic maps [15–21]
to provide more secure encryption techniques. The safety of secret data can be achieved using
dynamical chaotic systems in chaos-based secure communication [22–28]. The inclusion of chaotic
maps in vulnerable schemes can make them more secure against renowned attacks. The pseudo
random number generator for symmetric key encryption ciphers and one-way functions are two basic
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techniques for the execution of data protection. The ability of dynamical systems to induce nonlinearity
can be used to synthesize S-boxes, and the analyses of these kinds of boxes were very good against
different types of attacks.
The structure of the article is as follows: Section 2 presents the preliminaries. Section 3 consists of
the construction methodology for proposed S-box. In Section 4, we presented the analysis to measure
the resistance of the presented box against linear and differential types of attacks. Section 5 is the
conclusion.
2. Preliminaries
The proposed work is based on the action of general linear group and chaotic logistic map. There
are few works on the general linear group for the construction of S-boxes in the literature. In this
section, we briefly present the basics of these two modules to be used later in the section for proposed
S-box generation.
2.1. General Linear Group
The group that we will use is the action of projective linear group PGL(2, GF(28)) on Galois
field GF(28), and construct a nonlinear vector corresponding to a particular type of linear fractional
transformation (180z + 144)/(83z + 4) with the condition that 180× 4− 144× 83 6= 0.
f : PGL(2, GF(28))× GF(28)→ GF(28) ∪∞ (1)
f (z) = ((180z + 144)/(83z + 4)) (2)
where 180, 144, 83, 4 ∈ GF(28)
2.2. Logistic Map
The logistic map is a model of population growth given as [29]:
yk+1 = p ∗ yk ∗ (1− yk) (3)
where 0 < p < 4, y0 ∈ [0, 1]. Furthermore, the chaotic range for logistic map lies where p ∈ [3.6, 4]. p
is a positive constant and is known as biotic potential, which is responsible for the chaotic behavior.
While it had proposed by John Von Neumann in 1947, there are two logistic map sequences which we
are using in proposed work, with initial parameters as y0 and y1 with p0 and p1.
Chaos has several benefits when applied in secure communication. It has been shown that chaotic
security algorithms have commended many advantages such as high security, speed, reasonable
computational overheads, and computational power over the traditional algorithms. One of the most
notable features is the sensitivity of the initial conditions. The values of the iterations are very sensitive
and change significantly by a tiny change in the initial conditions of either p or y.
Figure 1 illustrates the idea of sensitivity of initial conditions. Figure 1a shows the values of the
first 100 iterations against the initial parameters of p = 3.7 and y0 = 0.5. Figure 1b shows the values of
the 100 iterations generated after first 300 iterations against the initial parameters of p = 3.700000000
and y0 = 0.5 in red color and the values of the 100 iterations generated after first 300 iterations against
the initial parameters of p = 3.700000001 and y0 = 0.5 in blue color. It can be seen that the two graphs
are significantly different to each other despite a tiny difference in the initial condition of p. Similarly,
Figure 1c shows the values of the 100 iterations generated after first 300 iterations against the initial
parameters of p = 3.7 and y0 = 0.50000000 in red color and the values of the 100 iterations generated
after first 300 iterations against the initial parameters of p = 3.7 and y0 = y0 = 0.50000000 in blue color.
It can be seen that the two graphs are significantly different to each other despite a tiny difference in
the initial condition of y0.
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Figure 1. Illustration of sensitivity to initial conditions of logistic map. (a) values of the first 100
iterations against the initial parameters of p = 3.7 and y0 = 0.5, (b) comparison between the iteration
values generated from two slightly different initial conditions of p, (c) comparison between the iteration
values generated from two slightly different initial conditions of y0.
3. Propose S-Box
We have divided the proposed algorithm for the construction of S-box into three steps, we shall
construct the initial row vector with the help of linear fractional group technique for the construction
of nonlinear vector; this is explained earlier. In step 2, we shall construct the intermediate S-box with
the help of initial vector of step 1 and chaotic logistic map of Equation (3). In step 3, we shall take the
output of step 2 as a seed and will apply a particular permutation of S256 on it to get S-box with desire
properties. The illustration of the proposed generation of S-box and explanation of steps is as follows:
3.1. Step 1: Application of General Linear Group
In first step we are going to apply the action of projective linear group PGL(2, GF(28)) on Galois
field GF(28) as mentioned earlier. The methodology is explained in Table 1 and Galois field element
representation corresponding to a particular primitive irreducible polynomial can also be shown.
The output of this first step in form of 16 × 16 S-box is shown in Table 2.
Table 1. Construction of S-box using fractional transformation.
z f (z) = (az+b)
(cz+d) Here We Are Taking ζ
ii and ζ jj from Table 2 S-Box Elements
0 f (0) = (180(0)+144)
(83(0)+4) f (0) =
∆i
∆j 255
1 f (1) = (180(1)+144)
(83(1)+4) f (1) =
∆i2
∆j2
125
...
...
...
254 f (254) = (180(254)+144)
(83(254)+4) f (254) =
∆i254
∆j254
106
255 f (255) = (180(255)+144)
(83(255)+4) f (255) =
∆i255
∆j255
95
The purpose of step 1 is to destroy the linear structure of Galois field GF(28), because GF(28)
is basically a cyclic group and it is very easy to generate all its elements with the help of root of
primitive irreducible polynomial of degree 8. The process of cyclic generation of Galois field elements
is a linear operation. We have made this operation nonlinear with the help of linear fractional
transformation. A minimum requirement to make a linear operation into nonlinear operation is affine
transformation but here we are going beyond this because affine transformation is a particular case of
linear fractional transformation.
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Table 2. Initial vector corresponding to a = 183, b = 144, c = 83 and d = 4 of Mobius transformation
in matrix form.
255 125 26 23 249 72 44 32 33 34 202 30 191 186 248 211
166 189 195 62 242 150 253 45 165 239 143 169 2 103 183 65
86 130 91 40 219 223 60 210 168 73 115 139 154 175 187 75
124 39 152 218 131 251 185 81 28 157 109 12 6 13 224 226
135 230 188 164 149 128 116 228 217 173 212 8 84 80 243 93
20 146 194 36 42 35 79 77 179 9 151 85 172 52 118 222
15 14 101 18 112 117 55 92 48 178 22 25 54 231 4 16
138 64 160 134 46 200 120 238 137 114 108 241 61 153 50 3
132 78 163 110 90 201 129 47 236 53 104 246 49 41 100 158
232 68 21 159 141 227 197 208 245 38 215 156 70 133 43 127
198 180 74 190 89 37 69 209 98 136 29 182 87 126 207 237
51 122 155 204 192 247 206 59 24 82 63 83 17 107 184 142
205 167 19 121 216 177 96 66 105 123 229 113 214 11 234 94
0 221 240 220 31 196 119 161 252 181 148 99 111 56 97 244
67 250 199 57 254 7 203 145 171 225 140 193 213 102 174 1
58 10 88 147 233 170 5 176 71 235 27 144 162 76 106 95
In Figure 2, we have shown the nonlinearity of the initial vector and compared it with a linear
initial vector. It can be seen that red line presents a linear vector from 0 to 255 and green line shows
that nonlinear vector of step 1, which we shall use for the construction of S-box. This nonlinearity
of the initial vector will play an important role in improving the confusion creating capacity of the
proposed S-box.
0 50 100 150 200 250 300
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
Figure 2. Uncertainty of the initial vector.
3.2. Step 2: Applying Logistic Chaotic Map
In this step, we need the following stuff:
(a) Initial vector of step 1 as a basic seed, which is shown in Table 2. Let the initial seed be
represented as K with size 1 × 256.
(b) Define the two chaotic logistic map sequences as defined in Equation (3) with appropriate
initial conditions.
(c) Initial parameters for first logistic map are as follows p = 3.99234589 and y0 = 0.5. The first
logistic map sequence is represented as f1. The length of this sequence is 256.
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(d) Initial parameters for second logistic map are as follows p = 3.99777777 and y0 = 0.6. The
second logistic map sequence is represented as y. The length of this sequence is also 256.
(e) Define f2 = y155, that is f2 has a single value of second chaotic sequence which is placed at
155th position.
(f) Define a function pos_min as shown in Algorithm 1. It consists of two steps; in step 1,
“ones(1,256)” will give us a row vector with 256 values, all with a value of f2. In step 2, the position at
where the minimum difference lies will be set as an output.
(g) Use the initial seed of S-box generated with the help of general linear group shown in Table 2
and the logistic map, we will get the vector K1. The whole process of getting the output of this step is
depicted in Algorithm 2 and the output of this step is shown in Table 3.
Algorithm 1 To find the positions at where the minimum difference lies
Inputs: Two distinct logistic chaotic map sequences, f1, y and f2.
Output: Position location, pos_min.
1: function [pos_min] = f ind_pos_min( f1, f2)
2: f = f2 ∗ ones(1, 256)
3: di f f = abs(minus( f1, f ))
4: pos_min = f ind(di f f == min(di f f ))
5: End
Algorithm 2 To generate S-box with the input seeds of logistic map and general linear group
Inputs: Initial vector K of Table 1 (which is a substitution box), functions for logistic map and pos_min.
Outputs: Substitution box, K1.
1: i = 1
2: while i < 257 do
3: [pos_min] = f ind_pos_min( f1, y))
4: p = 0
5: for j← 1 : length(V) do
6: if pos_min == V(j) then
7: p = 1
8: end if
9: end for
10: if p == 0 then
11: V(i) = pos_min
12: K1(i) = K(pos_min)
13: x1 = 0.9× x1 + 0.1× K(pos_min)/255
14: y = logistic(k1, x1)
15: f2 = y(155)
16: i = i + 1
17: else
18: x0 = 0.9× x0 + 0.1× K(pos−min)/255
19: f1 = logistic(k0, x0)
20: end if
21: end while
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Table 3. Output of step 2.
Rows/Columns 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
0 84 44 60 125 119 238 63 110 207 22 191 187 48 252 202 93
1 181 50 57 118 151 56 92 192 86 229 171 19 113 10 233 24
2 242 161 139 27 13 126 170 21 134 122 17 20 34 216 159 40
3 138 201 107 100 152 0 81 127 42 213 65 128 251 197 237 172
4 136 95 221 102 165 45 49 135 190 85 99 222 41 162 80 32
5 106 137 164 109 72 53 43 12 89 101 26 38 74 124 71 158
6 16 54 163 147 209 64 120 160 66 186 97 239 166 112 178 8
7 47 37 3 133 2 108 247 223 206 250 114 76 15 211 155 231
8 123 88 248 203 115 208 210 245 1 195 144 154 156 196 230 96
9 79 182 67 117 111 168 183 142 232 175 157 131 193 220 184 189
10 146 148 35 87 91 31 77 61 236 4 167 234 205 33 52 94
11 73 212 9 83 214 227 145 200 51 62 149 30 59 11 103 98
12 70 194 14 243 235 199 169 174 68 5 224 140 218 179 255 246
13 254 215 188 39 75 23 82 253 29 173 78 143 153 249 28 225
14 180 58 150 244 176 217 105 204 116 46 69 185 130 219 177 6
15 198 228 141 132 104 121 18 7 226 240 90 129 241 25 55 36
3.3. Step 3: Application of Permutation to Get S-Box
In step 3 we shall choose a particular permutation µ ∈ S256 as shown in Table 4, and then apply it
on Table 3 ∈ GF(28) elements as follows;
S− box : S256 × GF(28)→ GF(28). (4)
µ(a0, a1, a2, ..., a255) = (aµ(0), aµ(1), aµ(2), ..., aµ(255)), (5)
where (a0, a1, a2, ..., a255), (aµ(0), aµ(1), aµ(2), ..., aµ(255)) ∈ GF(28). µ ∈ S256 will change the position of
elements of Table 3 in the form of proposed S-box, which is given in Table 5.
Table 4. Particular permutation µ of symmetric group of permutation S256.
Rows/Columns 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
0 94 30 171 84 96 215 28 246 3 216 245 255 152 86 31 180
1 118 208 184 237 204 112 185 109 183 182 76 159 19 149 44 239
2 123 173 103 12 195 154 63 244 256 188 65 130 18 194 38 72
3 162 45 78 137 119 83 165 98 27 142 249 125 100 238 120 199
4 9 7 20 200 174 42 243 136 91 102 52 139 242 117 213 59
5 60 47 232 43 145 181 114 167 229 8 150 221 172 132 23 210
6 192 231 35 69 22 115 201 151 247 193 222 39 54 178 56 85
7 138 104 214 48 107 175 240 108 16 21 17 141 62 88 74 14
8 61 248 226 144 90 95 71 202 10 81 53 163 110 254 75 32
9 11 224 101 129 177 253 111 37 24 33 140 131 113 2 155 206
10 68 197 66 147 6 79 189 25 187 49 134 5 64 146 241 70
11 217 168 124 205 158 170 143 209 207 191 223 196 15 51 50 169
12 153 73 36 160 127 219 87 122 135 55 97 41 190 233 126 157
13 13 133 121 235 1 252 93 34 251 211 212 179 92 106 67 82
14 29 99 234 148 227 176 225 203 40 198 105 220 58 4 250 166
15 186 26 218 156 161 236 164 57 128 46 89 228 230 77 116 80
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Table 5. The proposed S-box.
Rows/Columns 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
0 75 220 207 219 234 91 95 101 136 1 79 27 254 231 59 206
1 114 34 113 221 250 209 71 232 61 228 42 63 180 44 202 96
2 175 253 163 14 142 159 239 116 140 45 109 233 201 240 137 133
3 4 103 11 99 144 166 5 178 7 130 32 106 123 15 170 205
4 17 35 28 146 147 94 210 40 194 155 230 171 25 107 31 36
5 195 225 0 125 8 252 169 211 90 115 190 153 82 84 208 119
6 224 127 58 251 67 85 139 37 69 249 2 223 192 156 183 56
7 193 43 64 55 162 181 152 237 188 174 242 9 128 255 235 226
8 117 20 131 124 215 167 68 135 100 47 222 157 76 213 145 203
9 72 33 87 244 10 26 160 48 70 126 184 132 246 214 19 243
10 104 138 154 18 81 6 12 212 98 227 60 74 161 165 108 217
11 111 112 143 93 53 229 86 57 92 198 236 122 77 218 62 16
12 186 216 13 30 148 46 172 102 120 245 204 151 83 189 51 50
13 200 158 173 78 80 3 238 22 73 141 199 185 38 97 149 182
14 105 248 176 129 89 241 54 164 179 150 39 121 118 197 24 247
15 52 41 49 21 191 110 66 88 65 177 29 23 168 196 187 134
4. Analyses for Evaluating the Strength of S-Box
In the analyses section we shall determine the cryptographic strength of the propose S-box with
some suitable measures. To find the S-box with fitting confusion creating strength many standard
evaluating analyses are presented in literature such as DP, SAC, BIC, Nonlinearity, and LP. We shall
also use these criteria to test the security of proposed S-box.
4.1. Nonlinearity
Definition 1. Let f (x) : GF(2n) → GF(2) be an n Boolean function, the nonlinearity of f (x) can take
the form,
H f = minl∈Ln dH( f , l) (6)
where, Ln is a set of the whole linear and affine functions, dH( f , l) denotes the Hamming distance between f
and l.
The nonlinearity denoted by the Walsh spectrum can take the form,
N f = 2−n(1−maxω∈GF(2n)
∣∣∣S〈 f 〉(ω)∣∣∣) (7)
The cyclic spectrum of the function f (x) is,
S〈 f 〉 (ω) = 2−n ∑
x∈GF(2n)
(−1) f (x)⊕x.ω (8)
where, ω ∈ GF(2n), and x.ω denotes the dot product of x and w. The larger the nonlinearity N f of the
function f , the stronger the ability of its resistance to the linear attacks, and vice versa.
The results of nonlinearity of proposed algorithm are shown in Table 6, with the help of these
results we can say that the nonlinearity of the nonlinear values of the substitution box created by
the chaos-based scheme shaped in the reading are 112, 112, 112, 112, 112, 112, 112, 112. Nonlinearity
average value, minimum value and maximum value are 112, 112, and 112, respectively.
Table 6. Nonlinearity of proposed S-box.
f tn0 f tn1 f tn2 f tn3 f tn4 f tn5 f tn6 f tn7
112 112 112 112 112 112 112 112
Symmetry 2019, 11, 351 8 of 11
4.2. Strict Avalanche Criterion
SAC describes a fact that when one bit in the input of Boolean function changes, the
changing probability of every bit in its output is 1/2. In practical application, a correlation matrix,
the construction method is always constructed to test the SAC property of the Boolean function.
The results of SAC are shown in Table 7. In Table 7, we have shown the eight different Boolean
functions corresponding to S-box. It can be observed that the values are approximately equal to 0.5,
which is very good for cryptographic uncertainty. Therefore, the proposed nonlinear component
satisfies this criterion with approximately optimal values.
Table 7. SAC of proposed S-box.
0.515625 0.515625 0.453125 0.484375 0.562500 0.500000 0.453125 0.453125
0.468750 0.484375 0.562500 0.453125 0.5000 0.531250 0.500000 0.484375
0.515625 0.515625 0.500000 0.500000 0.4608750 0.500000 0.531250 0.562500
0.531250 0.531250 0.468750 0.531250 0.453125 0.546875 0.500000 0.500000
0.453125 0.500000 0.453125 0.500000 0.515625 0.531250 0.546875 0.500000
0.453125 0.515625 0.515625 0.546875 0.468750 0.531250 0.531250 0.468750
0.531250 0.531250 0.468750 0.531250 0.515625 0.484375 0.531250 0.468750
0.515625 0.562500 0.515625 0.531250 0.531250 0.515625 0.484375 0.484375
4.3. Bit Independent Criterion
Given a Boolean function f j, fk is a two bits output of an S-box, if f j ⊕ fk is highly nonlinear and
meets the SAC, the correlation coefficient of each output bit pair may be close to 0 when one input bit
is inversed. Thus, we can check the BIC of the S-box by verifying whether f j ⊕ fk (j 6= k) of any two
output bits of the S-box meets the nonlinearity and SAC. According to the description of BIC, an 8× 8
S-box produced by our procedure is checked. The results show the exclusive-or sum of all pairs of
output bits of this S-box is highly nonlinear and approximately fulfill SAC.
In Table 8, we have shown the results of bit independence criterion (BIC) for SAC. This analysis
is very important to know the confusion strength of any nonlinear algorithm. The requirement of
this analysis is that all values should be approximately equal to 0.5, and it can be observed that the
whole table is between 0.490234 and 0.525391. It means our S-box fulfills this criterion with very
close readings.
In Table 9, we presented the BIC for nonlinearity for proposed box. It can be observed that all the
values are 112 which is maximum possible nonlinearity for a secure S-box.
Table 8. Bit independence criterion for SAC.
—— 0.515625 0.486328 0.517578 0.500000 0.515625 0.509766 0.494141
0.515625 —— 519531 0.490234 0.511719 0.480469 0.501953 0.496094
0.486328 0.519531 —— 0.496094 0.525391 0.490234 0.507813 0.507813
0.517578 0.490234 0.496094 —— 0.494141 0.513672 0.505859 0.511719
0.500000 0.511719 0.525391 0.494141 —— 0.505859 0.494141 0.517578
0.515625 0.480469 0.490234 0.513672 0.505859 —— 0.509766 0.515625
0.509766 0.501953 0.507813 0.505859 0.494141 0.509766 —— 0.494141
0.494141 0.496094 0.507813 0.511719 0.517578 0.515625 0.494141 ——
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Table 9. Bit independence criterion for nonlinearity.
0 112 112 112 112 112 112 112
112 0 112 112 112 112 112 112
112 112 0 112 112 112 112 112
112 112 112 0 112 112 112 112
112 112 112 112 0 112 112 112
112 112 112 112 112 0 112 112
112 112 112 112 112 112 0 112
112 112 112 112 112 112 112 0
4.4. Differential Approximation Probability
The Differential approximation probability DPf can reflect the XOR distribution of the input and
output of the Boolean function, i.e., the maximum likelihood of outputting ∆y , when the input is ∆x,
DPf = max∆x 6=0,∆y
({x ∈ X| f (x)⊕ f (x⊕ ∆x) = ∆y}
2n
)
(9)
where, X denotes a set of all possible inputs, 2n is the number of elements in the set.
The smaller the DPf , the stronger the ability of the S-box for fighting against differential
cryptanalysis attacks, and vice versa. In Table 10, the results of differential approximation probabilities
are presented. It can be observed that all the values are 0.015625 and same which is equal to AES S-box
strength, this shows that our S-box is good against the differential type of attacks.
Table 10. Differential approximation probability of proposed S-box.
Rows/Columns 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
0 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156
1 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156
2 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156
3 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156
4 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156
5 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156
6 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156
7 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156
8 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156
9 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156
10 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156
11 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156
12 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156
13 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156
14 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156
15 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156
4.5. Linear Approximation Probability
Given two randomly selected masks Γx and Γy , we used Γx to calculate the mask of all possible
values of an input x, and use Γy to calculate the mask of the output values S(x) of the corresponding
S-box. After masking the input and the output values, and the maximum number of the same results
is called the maximum linear approximation that can be computed by the following equation:
LPf = maxΓx,Γy 6=0
∣∣∣∣{x|x.Γx = S(x).Γy}2n − 12
∣∣∣∣ (10)
where, Γx and Γy are the mask values of the input and output, respectively, X is a set of all possible
input values of x, the elements of which is 2n.
The smaller the LP, the stronger the ability of the S-box for fighting against linear cryptanalysis
attacks, vise-versa.
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5. Conclusions
In this manuscript, we have shown the usage of logistic chaotic map, symmetric group of
permutation and projective general linear group action to get high-quality S-box for encryption
algorithms. The method presented assurances the success of the SAC, nonlinearity, BIC with an
optimal reading and at the same time guarantying an extremely good differential and linear probability.
In Table 11, it can be seen that strength of proposed S-box is comparable with well-known prevailing
S-boxes. So, one can use the proposed S-box for secure communication in any block cipher encryption
algorithm. Moreover, the proposed method can construct 256! S-boxes based on the permutation of
S256. The S-box which we have constructed in this paper is an example and a member of combination
of eight output bits of AES S-box.
Table 11. Comparison of the chaotic and non-chaotic S-boxes with proposed S-box.
S-Boxes/Analyses Minimum Nonlinearity SAC Offset Minimum BIC-Nonlinearity DP LP
Ref [2] 112 0.02637 112 0.015625 0.0625
Ref [9], S-box1 112 0.02579 112 0.015625 0.0625
Ref [12] 112 0.02502 112 0.015625 0.0625
Ref [13] 100 0.03125 100 0.0290525 0.070557
Ref [14] 104 0.02007 96 0.0390625 0.148438
Ref [25] 108 0.01833 104 0.03125 0.09375
Ref [9], S-box2 107.5 0.4971 103.85 NA NA
Ref [9], S-box3 104 0.4531 112 NA NA
Proposed 112 0.01567 112 0.01562 0.0625
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